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 In Rollover Risk: Ideating a U.S. Debt Default,2 I examined how a U.S. debt 
default might occur and analyzed its potential consequences. Even a mere “technical” 
default, such as temporarily missing an interest or principal payment, “almost certainly 
                                                 
1 Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law. This 
article is copyright ©2014 by the author, who thanks Donald S. Bernstein, Julie Maupin, 
H. Jefferson Powell, Christopher H. Schroeder, Neil S. Siegel, . . . for valuable comments 
and Sean S. Bach, Associate in Research, Duke Law School, and Jonathan W. Rash, 
Duke Law class of 2014, for excellent research assistance. 
2 55 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2014) (hereinafter, Rollover Risk). 
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[would] have large systemic effects with long-term adverse consequences for Treasury 
finances and the U.S. economy.”3 The most plausible U.S. debt default would in fact be a 
technical default—a temporary default due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt 
ceiling.4 The U.S. Department of the Treasury (the “Treasury Department”) recently 
cautioned that such a default, which became a near-reality in October 2013, could be 
disastrous: “In the event that a debt limit impasse were to lead to a default, it could have a 
catastrophic effect on not just financial markets but also on job creation, consumer 
spending and economic growth . . . .”5    
 
 This article focuses on that potential cause of a U.S. debt default—a technical 
default resulting from Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling—and analyzes 
how the executive branch of the federal government (hereinafter, “Executive Branch”) 
might be able to avoid such a default. To that end, Part I of this article provides historical 
context, explaining the debt ceiling as a means of delegating certain congressional 
borrowing authority to the Executive Branch and discussing the ongoing potential for 
debt-ceiling showdowns. Part II examines the publicly discussed options for avoiding a 
U.S. debt default, including the argument that the President has implicit borrowing 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Executive Branch could 
prioritize its payment obligations. Part II also explains why these options are not 
generally considered viable.  
 
 Part III of the article proposes alternative options for avoiding default, applying 
structured finance modeling to federal debt. In the first of these options, a special-purpose 
                                                 
3 Terry Belton et al., The Domino Effect of a US Treasury Technical Default, J.P. 
MORGAN 1 (Apr. 19, 2011), http://perma.cc/0ZNnoaut2AB (explaining the possible 
effects of a technical default on U.S. debt caused by the failure to raise the debt ceiling). 
That report also concludes that a technical default would, at a minimum, cause the United 
States to “likely” suffer “a one percent reduction in gross domestic product (GDP) due to 
higher interest rates and a likely equity selloff,” and that such a default also “could leave 
lasting damage in its wake due to a permanent decline in foreign demand” for Treasury 
securities, which would “likely lead to higher borrowing costs and larger deficits.” 
4 Rollover Risk, supra note 2. 
5 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., THE POTENTIAL MACROECONOMIC EFFECT OF DEBT CEILING 
BRINKSMANSHIP 6 (2013). 
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entity would issue debt that is not full faith and credit to the U.S. government per se and 
would use the proceeds to make a back-to-back loan to an Executive Branch agency or 
entity on a non-recourse but secured basis. In the second of these options, the special-
purpose entity would use the proceeds to purchase income-generating financial assets, 
such as rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues. Part III also provides a 
detailed legal analysis of these alternative options.     
 
 Finally, Part IV of the article explains how credit rating agencies (“rating 
agencies”) and investors would likely view these alternative options. Part IV also 
discusses how these options should be constrained to prevent their potential abuse.  
 
 I. INTRODUCTION  
  
 Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has exclusive authority to issue debt “on 
the credit of the United States.”6 Congress has long delegated some of that power to the 
Treasury Department.7 To avoid having to micromanage the Treasury Department’s debt 
issuances, Congress created the public debt limit8—colloquially known as the “debt 
ceiling”—within which the Treasury Department has virtually unfettered debt-issuance 
authority.9  
 
 As government costs increase, the debt ceiling may need to be raised to finance 
those costs.10 A substantial component of annual U.S. government expenditures is the 
                                                 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 (providing that “The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
borrow Money on the credit of the United States”). 
7 1 Cong. Ch. 12 (Sep. 2, 1789), 1 Stat. 65 (available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/act-congress.aspx). 
8 31 U.S.C. § 3101. 
9 Rollover Risk, supra note 2.  
10 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE BUDGET FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 – Historical Tables, Table 1.1 (2014) (indicating that the U.S. 
government is projected to operate at a deficit, albeit shrinking, through fiscal year 2018; 
if the government collects less in total than it spends, it must increase its level of debt 
overall). 
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payment of debt service—principal and interest—on maturing Treasury securities.11 
Congress thus can threaten a default by refusing to raise the debt ceiling,12 creating the 
potential for a debt-ceiling showdown between Congress and the Executive Branch. Such 
a showdown will loom large, for example, if Congress and the President are at 
loggerheads on spending and Congress uses the debt ceiling as leverage to try to extract 
spending cuts—a scenario that has occurred many times over the years, including during 
the Clinton Administration13 and more recently during the Obama Administration.14 This 
type of showdown can occur frequently because the federal government, like most 
governments worldwide, routinely depends on borrowing new money—often above the 
debt limit15—to repay (i.e., refinance) its maturing debt.16  
 
 In October 2013, the Obama Administration thus warned that if the debt limit 
were not raised, the United States would shortly default on its debt.17 Congress agreed to 
                                                 
11 Cf. id. at Table 3.1 (observing that “Net Interest” as a percentage of total “U.S. 
Government Outlays,” or spending, has historically been 9% on average from 1940-2012, 
and is expected to fall to around 6% in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 before gradually rising 
to over 10% in fiscal year 2018). For an explanation of Treasury securities, see infra note 
121 and accompanying text. 
12 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. See also Rollover Risk, supra note 2 
(discussing other debt-ceiling showdowns). 
14 See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that the rising federal government 
debt load inevitably makes future debt-ceiling increases necessary). 
16 See Rollover Risk, supra note 2. One might ask why governments routinely depend on 
borrowings to repay maturing debt. The answer is cost: using short-term debt to fund 
long-term projects is attractive because, if managed to avoid a default, it tends to lower 
the cost of borrowing. The interest rate on short-term debt is usually lower than that on 
long-term debt because, other things being equal, it is easier to assess a borrower’s ability 
to repay in the short term than in the long term, and long-term debt carries greater 
interest-rate risk. Id. 
17 The Treasury Department estimated that if the debt ceiling were not raised by October 
17, 2013, it would have only $30 billion in cash, which would be used up in days. See 
THE POTENTIAL MACROECONOMIC EFFECT OF DEBT CEILING BRINKSMANSHIP, supra note 
5.  
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a temporary increase, but the issue will arise again in February 2014.18 The problem, 
though, is not limited to that date. As mentioned, the risk that a debt-ceiling showdown 
could trigger a debt default has been historically significant.19 And it will continue to be 
significant, even if Congress and the President manage to agree in February on an 
appropriate debt ceiling, because the rising federal government debt load will inevitably 
make future debt-ceiling increases necessary.20  
 
 My analysis assumes that Congress fails, due to political paralysis, political 
gamesmanship, procedural voting impediments, or any other reason other than a clear 
desire to force the nation to default on its debt, to raise the debt ceiling; that more U.S. 
debt is coming due than can be refinanced under the applicable debt limit; and that the 
Executive Branch is searching for ways to avoid a debt default. The article first examines 
and critiques the extant options for avoiding default, showing that each such option has 
serious legal or practical impediments, or both.21 Thereafter, the article proposes and 
analyzes alternative options for avoiding default.22 
 
 II. EXTANT OPTIONS FOR AVOIDING DEFAULT  
  
 Principally, two options have been discussed for avoiding a U.S. debt default: (A) 
that the President has implicit authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
                                                 
18 The increase, which was implemented by temporarily suspending the debt ceiling, 
expires on February 7, 2014. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, PL 113-46, 127 
Stat 558 (Oct. 17, 2013).  
19 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
20 Cf. Joe Nocera, Why the Debt Ceiling Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at A27 
(reporting that “U.S. finances are on a troubling long-term trajectory [in part because the] 
government has promised more to future retirees than taxpayers seem willing to pay”). 
Congress constitutionally cannot raise the debt ceiling for an unlimited amount, even in 
the unlikely event it were politically willing to do so. Rollover Risk, supra note 2. 
21 See infra Part II. This list of options takes into account, among other sources, Nelson 
D. Schwartz & Charlie Savage, Wall St. Fears Go Beyond Shutdown, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2013, at B1 (discussing that “economists and investors have quietly begun to explore the 
options the White House might have in the event Congress fails to act” on raising the 
federal debt limit).  
22 See infra Part III. 
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Constitution to borrow in order to avoid such a default; and (B) that the Executive Branch 
could prioritize payments, paying its maturing debt first, in order to avoid default. 
Consider these options in turn, along with other less-discussed options. 
 
 A. The Fourteenth Amendment Option 
 According to this option, the President may “invoke authority under the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment” to the U.S. Constitution and order the “government to keep 
borrowing.”23 The rationale for this implicit authority is that the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibits the government from questioning the “validity” of its public debt.24 This option 
is reported to have been “endorsed by former President Bill Clinton during an earlier debt 
standoff in 2011.”25 Two legal scholars have argued that it is one of the “least 
unconstitutional” options.26  
 
 The problem, however, is that this option may not be constitutional at all and, 
even if it is, the resulting uncertainty will be costly. The Fourteenth Amendment does not 
explicitly authorize the Executive Branch to borrow in order to avoid default. Nor does it 
appear to provide any implicit authorization: its provision prohibiting the government 
from questioning the “validity” of its public debt was historically included solely to 
prevent a southern Democratic majority from repudiating Civil War debts.27  
                                                 
23 Schwartz & Savage, supra note 21. 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.  
25 Schwartz & Savage, supra note 21. 
26 Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional 
Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1194 (2012). Scholars have criticized this article’s framing of 
options as “least unconstitutional,” arguing that it is conceptually nonsensical to talk 
about the best (or least worst) way to violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, 
Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/experts-see-potential-ways-out-
for-obama-in-debt-ceiling-maze.html. Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School 
also rejected Dorf and Buchanan’s idea, saying “it was proposed by ‘otherwise very 
sensible law scholars’ who in this case had concocted ‘a prescription for a free-for-all that 
abandons the rule of law.’ ‘We have no metric for comparative lawlessness.’” Id.  
27 Michael W. McConnell, Origins of the Fiscal Constitution, in IS U.S. GOVERNMENT 
DEBT DIFFERENT? 45, 49-50 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2012); Stuart McCommas, Note, 
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 Although that provision has been held to apply generally, not just to Civil War 
debts,28 it is doubtful that “question[ing]” the “validity” of U.S. debt includes defaulting 
on such debt.29 One leading scholar has lucidly explained the distinction as follows: 
“Default is not the same as repudiation. If Congress repudiated the debt, it would be 
declaring that the debt is not owed. If Congress defaulted on the debt, the [debt] would 
still be owed; it would simply go (in part) unpaid.”30 The Obama Administration itself 
has announced that it does “not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the 
President the power to ignore the debt ceiling — period.”31   
 
 Debt borrowed by the federal government in violation of the debt ceiling would 
therefore be, at best, of uncertain constitutional validity. Any such borrowing could 
therefore have adverse consequences. For example, it “might provoke a threat of 
impeachment” from members of Congress opposed to such borrowing, such as House 
Republicans.32 Almost certainly, any such borrowing would be litigated up to the 
Supreme Court.33 Furthermore, and of greater practical importance, investors in debt 
                                                                                                                                                 
Forgotten but Not Lost: The Original Public Meaning of Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 99 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1325 (2013) (“Under the original public meaning of 
[Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment], only legal action directly repudiating the 
federal debt is unconstitutional.”). 
28 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935). 
29 I discuss this at length in Rollover Risk, supra note 2. 
30 McConnell, supra note 27, at 50. 
31 Statement of Jay Carney, White House Press Secretary, Oct. 3, 2013. 
32 Schwartz & Savage, supra note 21. 
33 There is a chance, however, that any dispute between the Executive Branch and 
Congress over unauthorized borrowing would be deemed a nonjusticiable political 
question. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (enumerating the factors 
relevant to the question whether a particular suit should be dismissed as a political 
question); Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders 
in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 78 (2002) (“Courts will resolve separation of 
powers issues; however, they will not mediate ‘political questions’ or disputes that are 
strictly between the executive and legislative branches.” (citations omitted)). But see 
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1428 (2012) (“The Judicial Branch appropriately 
exercises [its substantive] authority, including in a case such as this, where the question is 
whether Congress or the Executive is ‘aggrandizing its power at the expense of another 
branch.’” (citations omitted)); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential 
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securities evidencing the borrowing would likely demand a significant discount to 
compensate for the risk that the securities would be unenforceable.34 
 
  B. The Prioritization-of-Payments Option   
  Under this option, the Executive Branch would try to prioritize its payments, 
paying the maturing debt first in order to avoid default.35 It is uncertain, though, whether 
the Executive Branch has legal authority to pick and choose which creditors to pay.36 The 
authority to pay all debts of the United States is constitutionally vested in Congress.37 
Congress has delegated the execution of that authority to the Secretary of the Treasury 
Department (“Secretary of the Treasury”), who is required by law to make all payments 
on government obligations as they come due.38 An attempt by the House of 
Representatives to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to prioritize which obligations to 
pay failed in the Senate.39 
 
  Even if the Executive Branch does have the authority to choose which creditors to 
pay first, prioritizing payments would be “logistically forbidding” because the 
government uses “an ancient [payment] system that wasn’t designed for debt-ceiling 
damage control.”40 The Treasury Department would have to choose which among  
                                                                                                                                                 
Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1131 n.122 
(2013) (“The Supreme Court has recently signaled a narrow view of the political question 
doctrine, even in the area of foreign affairs.”) (citing Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427).   
34 Cf. Schwartz & Savage, supra note 21 (reporting that “specialists on Wall Street said 
questions about the legality of [such debt securities] might cause potential buyers to 
eschew them”). 
35 Id. This option, called the paid prioritization effort, was included in the House of 
Representatives’ Fall 2013 Continuing Resolution.  
36 Nocera, supra note 20 (reporting that “the Treasury Department says it does not have 
the authority to pick and choose which creditors to pay”). See also Rollover Risk, supra 
note 2. 
37 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that “The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay 
the Debts . . . .”). 
38 31 U.S.C. § 321(a)(3).  
39 The Full Faith and Credit Act, H.R. 807, 113th Cong. (2013), was passed by the House 
of Representatives but died in the Senate.   
40 Congress’s Blueprint for Global Catastrophe, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK., Oct. 10, 2013, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-10/bloomberg-view-
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“approximately 80 million separate payments per month” to pay.41 Moreover, it is 
doubtful that prioritizing payments, if otherwise feasible, would be sufficient. In the 
recent debt-ceiling showdown, for example, prioritizing payments would have been 
unlikely to buy more than two weeks of time.42  
 
  C. Other Extant Options 
  Other options discussed for avoiding a U.S. debt default have been more fanciful. 
The most plausible, perhaps, is the $1 trillion platinum coin proposal. Congress has 
authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to mint platinum coins in any size, shape, and 
most importantly, denomination.43 The Secretary of the Treasury therefore could mint $1 
trillion platinum coins, deposit them into the Treasury Department’s account at the 
Federal Reserve Bank, and possibly issue warrants and checks on the newly available 
funds without violating the debt limit.44  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
congresss-blueprint-for-global-catastrophe. See also Schwartz & Savage, supra note 21 
(questioning the government’s ability to prioritize its payments). 
41 Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury to John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 14, 2013) (on file with author) 
(stating in part, “The U.S. government makes approximately 80 million separate 
payments per month. These include payments for Social Security; Supplemental Security 
Income; Medicare; Medicaid; national security needs, including military salaries, military 
retirement, veterans’ benefits, and defense contractors; income tax refunds; federal 
employee salaries and retirement; law enforcement and operation of the justice system; 
unemployment insurance; disaster relief; goods and services sold to the government 
under contracts with small and large businesses; and many others.”). 
42 Cf. Nocera, supra note 20 (reporting that on November 1, 2013, “nearly $70 billion has 
to be paid for Social Security, Medicare, military paychecks and other obligations”). I 
reached that same conclusion during a September 25, 2013 conference call with 
approximately a dozen Congressional staffers, who sought my advice on the then-
impending debt-ceiling showdown.  
43 31 U.S.C. 5112(k) (providing that “The Secretary may mint and issue platinum bullion 
coins and proof platinum coins in accordance with such specifications, designs, varieties, 
quantities, denominations, and inscriptions as the Secretary, in the Secretary’s discretion, 
may prescribe from time to time.”). 
44 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011, 
10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/07/28/balkin.obama.options/ (although 
Balkin seems to take a neutral stance on the merits of this mint-and-then-deposit 
approach). 
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  A leading economist strongly supports this idea, declaring it to be “economically 
harmless” (because it would be inflation neutral45) and proclaiming that “no matter how 
offbeat or silly it may sound . . . , Mint that coin!”46 Some legal scholars have observed, 
however, that the $1 trillion platinum coin proposal fails as a pragmatically viable 
solution because it is so “cartoonish and desperate that it could undermine faith in the 
government’s ability to repay its obligations” and would create market uncertainty.47 
Commentators are also worried about the proposal’s political consequences.48  
 
 III. ALTERNATIVE OPTIONS FOR AVOIDING DEFAULT 
 
 Because of the legal and practical impediments of the foregoing options, I next 
propose and analyze possible alternative options for avoiding default.49 These options 
attempt to bypass traditional borrowing limitations by applying structured finance 
modeling to federal debt. Structured finance is an essential basis of corporate finance, and 
an increasingly important basis of state and municipal finance.50 Its use in federal public 
finance has heretofore been minimal, however, probably because Treasury securities 
already bear extremely low interest rates.51    
 
 Each of the structured finance options proposed would use an existing or newly 
created special-purpose entity, or “SPE,” to issue debt that is not full faith and credit to 
                                                 
45 Paul Krugman, Rage Against the Coin, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/rage-against-the-coin/. 
46 Paul Krugman, Op. Ed., Coins Against Crazies, N.Y. TIMES, January 11, 2013, at A23. 
47 Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 26, at 1231.  
48 Platinomics: The Economics of the Platinum Coin Option, ECONOMIST (Jan. 9, 2013), 
available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/01/economics-
platinum-coin-option. 
49 I first posited these options in an October 2013 lecture at Stanford Law School on 
“Legal and Economic Causes and Consequences of a US Debt Default.” 
50 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Use and Abuse of Special-Purpose Entities in Public Finance, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 369 (2012) (hereinafter, “SPEs in Public Finance”). 
51 Cf. confidential e-mail from senior U.S. House of Representatives staffer to the author 
(Oct. 9, 2013) (observing that the SPE-borrowing option “wouldn’t look terribly 
attractive [from an interest-rate standpoint] next to the large, highly liquid, and low cost 
Treasury market”). 
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the U.S. government per se. By analogy, many states raise the majority of their funding 
through SPEs, as opposed to directly issuing general obligation bonds.52 One of the 
reasons they do so is to borrow without violating archaic state-constitution-mandated 
debt ceilings.53 This article’s structured finance options have a similar goal: to enable the 
federal government to borrow without violating the archaic—or, at least, politically 
dysfunctional—borrowing constraints under the U.S. Constitution.   
 
 The analysis below begins by examining two structured finance options—a back-
to-back borrowing option,54 and an asset-sale option55—that the Executive Branch could 
utilize, absent congressional authorization, to raise funding to repay maturing federal debt 
(thereby avoiding default). It also provides a detailed legal analysis of these options. 
Thereafter, the analysis examines how rating agencies and investors would likely view 
the SPE debt issued to raise that funding.56 Finally, the analysis examines how the 
options could potentially be abused, and how to protect against such abuse.57    
 
 A. The Back-to-Back Borrowing Option  
 Under this option, an SPE would issue debt securities in amounts needed to repay 
maturing federal debt. The SPE would then lend the proceeds to an Executive Branch 
agency or entity on a back-to-back maturity basis.58 As a somewhat parallel precedent to 
this structure, the U.S. Federal Reserve very successfully created and used SPEs and 
back-to-back lending on an emergency basis, in 2008, to surmount statutory lender-of-
last-resort restrictions under the Federal Reserve Act.59 
 
                                                 
52 SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 370. 
53 Id. at 375-76. 
54 See infra Part III.A. 
55 See infra Part III.B. 
56 See infra Part IV.A. 
57 See infra Part IV.B. 
58 A senior Senate staffer with whom I shared the idea underlying these options observed, 
“That’s a very interesting idea. It’s really scary that we’re this close to thinking about it.” 
E-mail from confidential senior U.S. Senate source, Oct. 9, 2013 (on file with author). 
59 SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 373 n. 17. 
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 This structure is roughly analogous to a synthetic collateralized loan obligation 
(CLO) structure, in which an SPE issues securities to investors and then uses the 
proceeds to generate or acquire income-producing loans that serve to support ultimate 
repayment to the investors.60 The CLO market is increasingly important and robust.61 
 
 I next examine this structure from a legal standpoint, focusing first on creating an 
SPE to issue debt securities62 and thereafter on the SPE’s back-to-back on-lending of the 
proceeds of the debt issuance.63 I later examine this structure from the standpoint of 
rating agencies and investors.64  
 
                                                 
60 See, e.g., 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 7.02[G][4] (Jason H.P. Kravitt, 
ed., 2d ed., 2007).  
61 See, e.g., Kristen Haunss, Wall Street Props CLO Boom as Rules Lift Costs: Credit 
Markets, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 26, 2013, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-
11-26/wall-street-props-clo-boom-as-rules-lift-costs-credit-markets.html.  
62 See infra Part III.A.1. 
63 See infra Part III.A.2. 
64 See infra Part IV.A. 
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 1. Creating an SPE to Issue Debt Securities.  A threshold question for this 
structure—and also for the asset-sale structure65—is whether the Executive Branch has 
the power and authority, absent explicit congressional delegation,66 to create an SPE that 
could issue debt securities. Although the stand-alone power of the Executive Branch to 
create corporate entities has never been directly tested in the courts,67 history (and logic) 
suggests that it has discretion to create such entities for the purpose of executing 
legislation passed by Congress. In our case, I argue that the Executive Branch’s authority, 
acting through the Treasury Department, to finance federal government operations and to 
pay the government’s financial obligations should provide sufficient power to create a 
debt-issuing SPE that is not itself, and that does not act as, an agency of the federal 
government. The mere failure of Congress to raise the debt ceiling should not undermine 
that authority.68  
 
 Thus, I argue that, through the issuance of a presidential Executive Order, the 
Executive Branch should have the power and authority to create a non-governmental SPE 
                                                 
65 See infra Part III.B.1. 
66 Congress itself clearly has the power to create SPEs that are in furtherance of 
legitimate governmental goals. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, under the 
authority of the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
18 (providing Congress with the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution . . .all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States . . . .”)). 
67 In the early 1940s, an Executive Branch agency, the Farm Security Administration, 
created several corporations in order to circumvent its own lack of statutory authority to 
purchase land. The inquiry into the legality of that agency’s actions was split along 
political lines with the Attorney General approving, and the Comptroller General 
disapproving. 15 GAO-RB pt. B, s. 3 (G.A.O.), 2008 WL 6969355, at *5. 
68 See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (observing that Congress’s failure, due to 
failed political gamesmanship or procedural voting impediments, to raise the debt limit 
would not express a clear congressional desire to force the nation to default on its debt; 
and also observing that congressional refusal to act has generally been insufficient to put 
the President and Congress directly at odds with one another under Youngstown). See 
also infra note 88 (the Supreme Court’s holding that a presidential executive agreement 
was clearly valid, despite evidence that Congress informally opposed it, because the 
executive agreement was consistent with the general tenor of the statutory regime at 
issue).  
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that could issue debt securities. First, I contend that such power and authority are 
implicitly delegated by Congress to the Secretary of the Treasury, who is responsible to 
pay principal and interest on federal debt. Thereafter, I contend that the creation of such a 
debt-issuing SPE would not violate Congress’s restrictions on Executive Branch creation 
of corporations under the Government Corporation Control Act.    
 
 The power to create a debt-issuing SPE is implicit in Congress’ delegation of 
responsibility to pay federal debt.  The Secretary of the Treasury is statutorily tasked with 
redeeming, reissuing,69 and paying both principal and interest on Treasury securities.70 
U.S. presidents have the power to issue presidential executive orders (“Executive 
Orders”) to help members of the Executive Branch fulfill their responsibilities.71 The 
President therefore could issue an Executive Order directing the Secretary of the Treasury 
to create an SPE to issue debt and to use the proceeds to help pay maturing Treasury 
securities. The Executive Order would represent a resolution of ostensibly inconsistent 
congressional directives—on the one hand, to pay outstanding federal debt and, on the 
other hand, not to raise the debt ceiling—and would have the force of law, at least until 
Congress specifically says otherwise. The Executive Branch generally has substantial 
                                                 
69 31 U.S.C. § 3111. 
70 31 U.S.C. § 3123(b). 
71 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (recognizing the President’s 
authority to issue Executive Orders); Legal Aid Soc. of Alameda Cnty. v. Brennan, 381 
F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (“[E]xecutive orders clearly carry the force and effect 
of law if they are issued pursuant to constitutional or statutory authority.”); see also John 
E. Noyes, Executive Orders, Presidential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEX. L. 
REV. 837, 841 (1981) (“The President’s power to issue executive orders derives from the 
Constitution or from federal statute.”) (citations omitted); Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and 
Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential Directives, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 267, 
276–87 (2001) (discussing the sources of presidential authority for Executive Orders and 
providing a brief history of Executive Orders). See generally John C. Duncan, Jr., A 
Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive 
Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333 (2010) (supplying a detailed account of the legal, historical, and 
philosophical underpinnings of Executive Orders). 
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discretion in interpreting its obligations as defined by Congress, and its interpretation of 
legislation is usually afforded substantial deference.72 
 
 Congress theoretically could repeal an Executive Order creating a debt-issuing 
SPE for the purpose of avoiding default, but that would require a veto-bypassing 
supermajority,73 which is unlikely to occur. Executive Orders are also subject to legal 
challenges, but those challenges are almost never successful. Of the thousands74 of 
Executive Orders, only two appear to have been successfully challenged in court.75  
 
                                                 
72 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . 
. (citations omitted)); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law 
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 
‘execution’ of the law.”). See also Eric Posner, The President Has the Power to Raise the 
Debt Ceiling on His Own, SLATE (Jan. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/01/debt_ceili
ng_president_obama_has_the_power_to_raise_the_debt_limit_without.html (arguing that 
in raising the debt ceiling the President could rely on his “emergency powers” or his 
administrative power to resolve conflicting congressional directives).   
73 See, e.g., Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders 
in Modern-Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 71 (2002) (observing that “overturning a 
presidential directive requires more than enactment of legislation according to the normal 
legislative processes. It is not enough for Congress to have enough votes to simply pass a 
statute overturning the presidential order. It must also have enough votes to overcome the 
probable presidential veto.”). In other words, repealing a law—and an Executive Order is 
treated as law (see infra note 111 and accompanying text)—requires the same process as 
enacting a law, so if the repeal is vetoed by the President it would require a supermajority 
vote to override. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Cf. Noyes, supra note 71, at 846 & 846 n. 
38 (indicating that when “Congress . . . has acted[] to invalidate or repeal ‘incorrect’ 
executive branch interpretations of its statutes,” it has done so by passing legislation).  
74 As of January 20, 2014, U.S. presidents had issued 15,220 Executive Orders (of which 
168 were issued by President Obama). Gerhard Peters, Executive Orders, in The 
American Presidency Project (John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds., 1999-2014), 
available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/orders.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2014).  
75 The successful challenges are in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952), and Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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 The first successful challenge occurred in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,76 in which the steel industry persuaded the Supreme Court to overturn President 
Truman’s seizure through Executive Order of the entire U.S. steel industry. Justice 
Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown established the principles for analyzing the validity 
of Executive Orders, articulating three classifications of presidential power.77 The 
Supreme Court has since adopted Justice Jackson’s opinion, and his tripartite analytical 
framework, as controlling precedent.78 
 
 Under Justice Jackson’s analysis in Youngstown, the scope of presidential 
authority varies directly with the degree of congressional authorization for the action in 
question. The closer the President is to the will of Congress, the stronger the presumption 
that the presidential action is constitutionally valid. As it becomes less clear whether the 
President is acting consistent with congressional will, the more likely it is that the 
President lacks the constitutional authority to act. Justice Jackson identified three zones 
of presidential power.  
 
 In the first category, “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”79 An action “executed by 
the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of 
                                                 
76 See supra note 75. 
77 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). Even though Youngstown primarily concerned the President’s authority to 
act in the area of foreign affairs, “[a]ll agree, broadly, that Justice Jackson’s account of 
the distribution of executive and congressional powers in Youngstown Steel applies 
equally in foreign and domestic affairs.” Detlev Vagts & Anne-Marie Burley, Book 
Review, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 415, 416 (1992). 
78 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981) (relying on Justice 
Jackson’s analysis in evaluating the validity of unilateral presidential action); Medellin v. 
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524 (2008) (“Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme provides 
the accepted framework for evaluating executive action . . . .”). 
79 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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presumptions . . . and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might 
attack it.”80 In the second category,  
 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or 
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but 
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, 
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least 
as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent 
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law.81  
 
In the third category, “When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress 
over the matter.”82 Justice Jackson deemed President Truman’s seizure of the steel 
industry to be in the third category83 and ultimately voted with the majority in striking 
down the Executive Order.84 
 
 An Executive Order directing the Treasury Department to create an SPE for 
purposes of avoiding a debt default—provided the SPE does not violate the Government 
Corporation Control Act85—might arguably fall within the first zone of the Youngstown 
framework. Because Congress has delegated debt payment responsibility to the Secretary 
of the Treasury,86 the President would be acting pursuant to an implied authorization of 
Congress, so his authority should be at its maximum. Moreover, by helping to avoid the 
                                                 
80 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
81 343 U.S. at 637. 
82 343 U.S. at 637-38. 
83 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“This leaves the [steel] 
seizure to be justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping, where . . . . we 
can sustain the President only by holding that [the seizure] is within his domain and 
beyond control by Congress.”).  
84 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring).   
85 See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.   
86 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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serious adverse economic consequences (probably including a severe recession) of such a 
default,87 that Executive Order should also be consistent with the “general tenor” of the 
statutory regime under which the Executive Branch manages the economy. That 
consistency provides an independent basis for concluding that the Executive Order might 
fall within the first zone of the Youngstown framework.88  
 
 An Executive Order directing the Treasury Department to create an SPE for 
purposes of avoiding a debt default at least should fall within the second zone of the 
Youngstown framework, where the President acts upon his own independent powers in 
the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.89 The argument, 
                                                 
87 See supra note 5 & accompanying text (concluding that a “debt limit impasse [that] 
lead to a default . . . could have a catastrophic effect on not just financial markets but also 
on job creation, consumer spending and economic growth”). 
88 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding a presidential executive 
agreement to fall within zone one of the Youngstown framework despite evidence that 
Congress informally opposed the agreement; the Court reasoned that the executive 
agreement was consistent with the general tenor of the statutory regime allowing 
unilateral presidential action in times of national emergency to respond to hostile acts of 
foreign states).  
89 Even if such an Executive Order would fall within the third zone of the Youngstown 
framework, Congress might not be able to persuade the judiciary to declare the Order 
unconstitutional—in which case, as a practical matter, the Executive Order would stand. 
As discussed above, this issue of Executive power may be deemed a non-justiciable 
political question. See supra note 33. In addition, Congress (or members of Congress 
suing individually) may lack Article III standing to challenge unilateral Executive Branch 
action taken to avoid a default, at least until it takes an affirmative stance against the 
President. See, e.g., Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding 
that a group of congressmen lacked standing to challenge an Executive Order, and noting 
“that courts should refrain from interfering in disputes arising out of the legislative 
process when a political remedy is available from within that process”); Raines v. Byrd, 
521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (holding that a group of congressmen lacked standing where 
political remedies, such as passing new legislation, were available). Only when political 
remedies have been exhausted, or congressional votes effectively nullified by Executive 
Branch action, will courts recognize legislative standing. See Anthony Clark Arend & 
Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of 
Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 268 (2001) (“For a legislator to 
have standing, the [D.C. Circuit] in Campbell [v. Clinton] explained, there must be . . . . 
no other legislative remedies available to rectify the action by the [President]. This means 
that whatever had been done by the [President] cannot be undone by legislative action.”). 
 Yale J Reg - Feature.docx 
19 
explained below in more detail,90 would be that Congress’s failure to raise the debt 
ceiling represents “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” that, “as a practical 
matter, enable[s] . . . measures on independent presidential responsibility [that] depend on 
the imperatives of events”91—i.e., preventing a government default and its disastrous 
consequences.92 Congressional refusal to act is generally insufficient to put the President 
and Congress directly at odds with one another under Youngstown.93  
 
 The argument that Congress’s failure to raise the debt ceiling represents 
“congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence” presumes that such failure does not 
express a clear desire to force the nation to default on its debt (in which case the 
President’s power would fall within the third zone of the Youngstown framework, 
creating a strong presumption of unconstitutionality94).95 That presumption is supported 
by the facts. For example, the Majority Leader, Majority Whip, and two additional senior 
senators have demanded, in a private letter to the President, that he “take any lawful 
steps” to avoid default, including “without Congressional approval, if necessary.”96 The 
Full Faith and Credit Act, which was passed by the House of Representatives (although 
                                                 
90 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
91 343 U.S. at 637. 
92 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
93 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadow, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT 87, 93 (2002) (“[C]ourts tend to avoid exploring the President’s constitutional 
foreign affairs powers—express or implied—instead finding congressional authorization 
in questionable circumstances or simply assuming that presidential action should stand as 
long as Congress is silent.”); id. at 144 (“The Dames & Moore Court [relying on 
Youngstown] interpreted Congress’s silence not as its understanding of the scope of the 
Executive’s constitutional powers, but rather as a legislative authorization or approval of 
the Executive’s conduct.”). 
94 See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. 
95 This article assumes that Congress’s failure to raise the debt limit results from political 
paralysis, political gamesmanship, procedural voting impediments, or any other reason 
other than a clear desire to force the nation to default on its debt. See supra notes 20-21 
and accompanying text. 
96 Letter from Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, together with Senators Durbin, 
Murray, and Schumer, to Barak Obama, President of the United States of America (Jan. 
11, 2013) (copy on file with author). 
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dying in the Senate),97  provided that “In carrying out the statutory responsibilities to 
‘support of the public credit’ and ‘managing the public debt’ the Secretary [of the 
Treasury] shall take all necessary actions to ensure all obligations of the United States 
Government with regard to debt held by the public are fully discharged when due.”98 
Even members of Congress who have opposed raising the debt ceiling in the past have 
argued that the Executive Branch would still be able to take certain steps to avoid a 
default.99 Most parties agree, for example, that failure to raise the debt ceiling would not 
restrict the Treasury Department’s authority to attempt to prioritize payments in order to 
avoid a default.100 Congress’s failure to raise the debt ceiling, in other words, does not 
limit all possible methods of paying existing debt, nor does it require a default.  
 
 The power to create a debt-issuing SPE would not violate Congress’s restrictions 
on Executive Branch creation of corporations.  Under the Government Corporation 
Control Act (“GCCA”), Congress has restricted Executive Branch power to create 
corporations. The GCCA provides in relevant part that “An agency may establish . . . a 
                                                 
97 See supra note 39. 
98 Full Faith and Credit Act, supra note 39. 
99 See, e.g., Nick Wing & Shadee Ashtari, GOP Debt Ceiling Truthers Want You To 
Listen To Them, Not The Experts. What Could Go Wrong?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 
2013) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/16/gop-debt-ceiling_n_4101364.html 
(quoting Rep. Steve King [R-Iowa], appearing on the Tyler Cralle radio show on Oct. 7, 
2013, as stating in part, “The money masterminds decided we would hit that date (the 
debt ceiling) sometime in about July. . . . Well, [default] didn’t come, because the 
Treasury was using what they call extraordinary measures . . . . Which means they tapped 
into every account they possibly could, they delayed the payments that they could in 
other areas. . . . We can go indefinitely without hitting default. So . . . it troubles me a 
little bit that I see our House leadership use the language of default on the debt ceiling.”). 
See also id. (quoting Sen. Pat Toomey [R-Pa.], appearing on MSNBC on Oct. 9, 2013, as 
stating in part that “there’s zero chance the U.S. government is going to default on its 
debt. It’s unfortunate that people have conflated this idea of not raising the debt ceiling 
immediately on Oct. 17 as somehow defaulting on our debt. . . . There’s no way that any 
Treasury secretary or administration would willfully choose to have the catastrophic 
results that would occur if we actually defaulted on our debt when it’s not necessary.”). 
100 See supra note 99 (quoting Republican congressmen arguing that the debt ceiling does 
not affect the Executive Branch’s power to prioritize some financial obligations over 
others). Cf. supra note 35 and accompanying text (observing that the House of 
Representatives passed a Continuing Resolution in Fall 2013, authorizing a paid 
prioritization effort to attempt to avoid default). 
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corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the United States specifically 
authorizing the action.”101 If the Executive Order creating the debt-issuing SPE violates 
the GCCA, that Order—and hence the SPE created thereunder—would be presumed 
unconstitutional under the Youngstown framework.102 
 
 It should be feasible, however, to craft that Executive Order in a way that does not 
violate the GCCA.103 At the outset, the debt-issuing SPE should be organized as an entity 
that is not a “corporation.” Additionally, it should not be allowed to “act as an agency.” 
Consider these in turn.  
 
 In the financial world, debt-issuing SPEs are routinely organized as entities that 
are not corporations, the goal being to avoid an entity-level corporate tax.104 Typical 
debt-issuing SPEs are thus organized as limited liability companies (LLCs), partnerships, 
and even commercial trusts.105 If the Executive Order were to specify that the debt-
issuing SPE should be organized in one of those forms, that alone might be sufficient to 
avoid the GCCA’s application. 
 
 A party attempting to challenge that exemption might argue, however, that the 
GCCA’s use of the term “corporation” should be broadly construed to mean any generic 
“corporate” (i.e., separately existing) entity.106 Even given that broader interpretation, 
                                                 
101 31 U.S.C. § 9102.  
102 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing the third zone as one in which 
the Executive Branch takes “measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress”). 
103 Depending on politics, Congress could also retroactively approve the creation of the 
debt-issuing SPE. That could allow Congress to have its cake (by not raising the debt 
limit) and eat it too (by sanctioning the measures taken to avoid default). Of course, some 
members of Congress might later regret that approval if they want to again create a debt-
ceiling showdown. 
104 STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, BRUCE MARKELL, & LISSA L. BROOME, SECURITIZATION, 
STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS § 5.02 (4th ed. 2004). 
105 Id. § 5.02, at 117-127. 
106 Cf. U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of the General Counsel, III PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 15-71 (SEP. 2008) (suggesting that entities subject to the 
GCCA “may or may not be in actual corporate form”).  
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however, the debt-issuing SPE would still not be subject to the GCCA unless it “act[s] as 
an agency.” The SPE should not be acting “as an agency” if it is either a private entity 
that acts pursuant to specific contractual directions107 or a government-owned or 
controlled entity that does not engage in the implementation of government policy.108 I 
will propose debt-issuing SPEs that fall into those exempted categories.109    
 
 In closing the discussion of the GCCA, I should note a possible, though I believe 
flawed, argument that the GCCA itself might more explicitly delegate power to the 
Executive Branch to create a debt-issuing SPE. Recall that the GCCA provides that “An 
agency may establish . . . a corporation to act as an agency only by or under a law of the 
United States specifically authorizing the action.”110 An Executive Order itself, however, 
is “law.” It is well established that a President’s Executive Order, when necessary to 
enforce a federal statute, effectively becomes federal law and a part of the laws to which 
the statute relates.111 Under this reasoning, an Executive Order creating a debt-paying 
SPE would be within the first zone of the Youngstown framework because the President 
would be acting pursuant to an express authorization of Congress.112 The problem with 
                                                 
107 See, e.g., Varicon Int’l v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 934 F. Supp. 440, 446–47 (D.D.C. 
1996) (concluding that the U.S. Investigations Service was not established to “act as an 
agency” under § 9102 of the GCCA because it “appear[ed] to be a private corporation 
which was awarded a government contract”). 
108 Cf. Lebron v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 396 (1995) (stating that 
the GCCA phrase, “acting as an agency” of the United States, “was evidently intended to 
restrict the creation of all Government-controlled policy-implementing corporations, and 
not just some of them”) (emphasis in original).    
109 See Part IV.A, infra. 
110 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
111 U.S. v. Borja, 191 F. Supp. 563 (D. Guam 1961); U.S. v. Angcog, 190 F. Supp. 696 
(D. Guam 1961). Both of these cases cite to and rely on U.S. v. J. D. Streett & Co., 151 F. 
Supp. 469 (E.D. Mo. 1957). That case was modified sub nom., J. D. Streett & Co. v. U. 
S., 256 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1958), but the modification did not impact that case’s 
conclusions regarding Executive Orders. 
112 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. That argument could be further reinforced 
if the Secretary of the Treasury determines all material aspects of the debt securities 
issued by the SPE, including “(1) the form, denomination, maturity, interest rate, and 
conditions to which the obligations [under those debt securities] will be subject; (2) the 
way and time the obligations are issued; and (3) the price for which the obligations will 
be sold.” 31 U.S.C. § 9108(a). That determination would follow the GCCA’s prescription 
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this argument, however, is that it would be inconsistent with the House Report 
accompanying the legislation that became the GCCA, which indicates that the phrase “a 
law of the United States specifically authorizing the action” refers to further specific 
congressional authorization.113 Therefore, I am not suggesting that parties rely on an 
“express authorization” argument under the GCCA.     
 
 Summary.   In summary, by issuing an Executive Order, the Executive Branch 
should have at least implicit power and authority under Youngstown to create an SPE that 
could issue debt securities. If organized skillfully, that SPE would not violate Congress’ 
restrictions on Executive Branch establishment of corporations under the Government 
Corporation Control Act. 
 
 2. Lending the Proceeds on a Back-to-Back Basis.  The second step of the back-
to-back borrowing structure would be for the SPE to on-lend the proceeds of its issued 
debt to an Executive Branch agency or entity on a back-to-back maturity basis.114 For 
discussion purposes, this article will refer to that as the “on-lending.” The on-lending 
must be structured in a way that does not itself create debt that violates the federal debt 
limit. This creates a conundrum: How can the on-lending constitutionally avoid the need 
for congressional authorization, yet make investors in the SPE’s debt securities 
comfortable that there will be a reliable and adequate basis of repayment? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the Secretary of the Treasury make that determination “[b]efore a Government 
corporation issues obligations and offers obligations to the public.” Id. 
113 That House Report states in relevant part as follows: “The committee does not 
consider the practices of chartering wholly owned Government corporations without prior 
authorization by the Congress . . . to be desirable. It believes that all such corporations 
should be authorized and chartered under Federal statute. The bill provides that in the 
future all corporations which are to be established for the purpose of acting as agencies or 
instrumentalities of the United States must be established by act of Congress or pursuant 
to an act of Congress specifically authorizing such action.” H.R. Rep. No. 79-856, at 11 
(1945). 
114 Cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text (describing the back-to-back lending). This 
related question would be irrelevant to the asset-sale structure because the SPE in that 
structure uses the proceeds to purchase financial assets, not to make a loan.  
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 The structured finance concept of non-recourse debt can help to resolve this 
conundrum. The term non-recourse (sometimes spelled nonrecourse) debt is a misnomer; 
it means debt that has recourse to collateral consisting of specific assets, not debt that 
lacks all recourse.115 As explained below, non-recourse on-lending should be both 
constitutionally valid and acceptable to investors. 
 
 Non-recourse on-lending should be constitutionally valid because it would create 
neither general recourse debt nor full-faith-and-credit debt of the U.S. government—and 
thus the debt created by the on-lending should not be “on the credit of the United 
States.”116 The distinction between general recourse debt of the U.S. government and 
full-faith-and-credit debt of the U.S. government is unclear, and the terms might be 
synonymous. The phrase “full-faith-and-credit” is not explicitly statutorily defined in the 
context of U.S. government debt.117 Nonetheless, it appears to mean that holders of that 
debt have recourse generally to the United States government, and not merely to a 
particular government agency, for payment. That interpretation follows from the fact that 
federal statutes sometime state that the debt of specific governmental bodies is 
guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the United States118 and sometime state that 
such debt is not so guaranteed.119 Furthermore, general-obligation debt instruments 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “nonrecourse” debt as 
“an obligation that can be satisfied only out of the collateral securing the obligation and 
not out of the debtor’s other assets”).  
116 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s exclusive authority to 
issue that debt). 
117 When used to describe Treasury securities and other U.S. government debt, the phrase 
“full faith and credit” should not be confused with the “Full Faith and Credit Clause” of 
art. IV, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution. The latter addresses the duties of U.S. states to 
respect the “public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.”  
118 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (in the context of the Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae), providing that “The full faith and credit of the United States is 
pledged to the payment of all amounts which may be required to be paid under any 
guaranty [of Ginnie Mae debt] under this subsection.”) 
119 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 5808(a) (in the context of the National Natural Resources 
Conservation Foundation, providing that “The full faith and credit of the United States 
shall not extend to the Foundation.”). The phrase “full faith and credit” might have 
originated in part from the statutory language of 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a), which states “The 
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issued by the Treasury Department,120 including long-term bonds and short-term notes 
and bills (collectively, “Treasury securities” or colloquially, “Treasuries”), are generally 
understood to be backed by the “full faith and credit of the United States.”121  
 
 Non-recourse on-lending would not create general recourse debt, and thus would 
not create full-faith-and-credit debt, if the SPE has recourse only to collateral consisting 
of specific assets for repayment. Arguably, that should avoid the need for congressional 
authorization of the debt created by the on-lending. I recognize the absence of explicit 
precedent finding that non-recourse debt is not “on the credit of the United States.” That 
finding, however, would be logically compelling. Because non-recourse debt is payable 
solely from a finite source—the specified collateral—it exposes creditors to a real risk of 
loss.122 Those creditors are therefore not making their credit decision based on the ability 
of the U.S. government to repay them, nor would the U.S. government be liable to pay 
them.  
 
 That begs the question of why investors would be prepared to purchase the SPE’s 
debt securities if they are payable solely from specified collateral. In answer, the 
collateral must provide a sufficiently reliable and adequate basis of repayment to make 
the investors comfortable. The customary way to accomplish that is for the collateral to 
consist of specific high quality financial assets—i.e., assets that are expected to convert to 
cash.123  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
faith of the United States Government is pledged to pay . . . principal and interest on the 
obligations . . . issued under this chapter.”  
120 31 U.S.C. §§ 3102-3105. 
121 Treasurydirect.gov, Why You Should Consider Treasury Securities for Your Portfolio, 
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/articles/res_invest_articles_portfolio_0604.
htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2013) (on file with author). 
122 See text accompanying note 162, infra (discussing investor risk of loss). 
123 See Part IV.A, infra (discussing investor and rating agency perspectives). 
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 The most plentiful high quality financial assets that could be pledged as collateral 
would be rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues.124 Thus, the SPE could 
on-lend the proceeds of its debt issuance to the Treasury Department on a non-recourse 
basis. The Treasury Department would secure repayment of that loan with collateral 
consisting of rights to the future payment of specified tax revenues. (The Treasury 
Department has statutory authority to receive tax revenues, pursuant to which it created 
and oversees the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.125) The SPE would only have recourse to 
those specified revenues,126 if and when they are collected; it would not have recourse to 
other tax revenues, nor would it have general recourse to the Treasury Department or any 
other part of the U.S. government.127   
 
 B. The Asset-Sale Option 
                                                 
124 The power of the Executive Branch to give a security interest in assets, such as rights 
to the future payment of tax revenues, may well be subject to Congress’s broader power 
to “dispose of” assets. Cf. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 326 
(1942) (“Since the Constitution places the authority to dispose of public lands exclusively 
in Congress, the executive’s power to convey any interest in these lands must be traced to 
Congressional delegation of its authority.”) (emphasis added). The analysis of that 
Executive Branch power would therefore be subsumed in this article’s analysis of the 
Executive Branch’s power to sell those assets. See infra notes 136-152 and 
accompanying text. 
125 26 U.S.C. § 7801. 
126 I want to make it absolutely clear that the options I propose do not involve a first call 
on all tax revenues or a call on tax revenues for an indefinite period. The tax revenues 
serving as collateral in the first option, or being purchased in the second option, are in 
each case a finite set whose value would not so greatly exceed the amount of the 
financing that someone could call into question whether the first option is truly non-
recourse or the second option is truly a sale. 
127 If the federal government can constitutionally borrow solely through Executive 
Branch power in a way that makes investors in the SPE’s debt comfortable that there will 
be a reliable and adequate basis of repayment, one might ask what the SPE adds, and 
whether it would be simpler to omit the SPE step and have the federal government 
directly issue non-recourse debt to investors. At least part of the answer is that the market 
is more likely to understand that SPE-issued debt, as opposed to Treasury Department-
issued debt, is not full recourse to the government. That would reduce the chance of the 
debt being viewed as “potentially illegitimate,” which “could reduce investor confidence 
in the federal government’s commitment to meet its obligations.” Buchanan & Dorf, 
supra note 26, at 1210 n.135. 
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 Under this option, an SPE would, as before, issue debt securities in amounts 
needed to repay maturing federal debt. The SPE would then pay the proceeds to an 
Executive Branch agency or entity, most likely the Treasury Department, to purchase 
income-generating financial assets such as rights to the future payment of specified tax 
revenues.128 The SPE’s securities would be repayable from collections on the purchased 
financial assets. Because only the SPE, and not the federal government, is borrowing or 
legally liable for repayment, this structure would not create debt that could violate the 
federal debt limit.  
 
 
 This structure is analogous to a standard securitization structure, in which an SPE 
issues securities to investors and then uses the proceeds to purchase income-producing 
financial assets that serve to support ultimate repayment to the investors.129 Securitization 
is a major source of financing both domestically and worldwide.130  
                                                 
128 See supra notes 124-125 (discussing the Treasury Department’s right to receive future 
tax revenues).  
129 SCHWARCZ, MARKELL, & BROOME, supra note 104, § 1.03. 
130 Cf. Huw Jones, Bank of England to Take Fresh Look at Securitization Market, 
REUTERS, Nov. 28, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/28/us-boe-
regulation-idUSBRE9AR0LD20131128 (reporting that the Bank of England “may step in 
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 I next examine this structure from a legal standpoint, focusing first on creating an 
SPE to issue debt securities131 and thereafter on the SPE’s using the proceeds of the debt 
issuance to purchase financial assets.132 I later examine this structure from the standpoint 
of rating agencies and investors.133 
 
 1. Creating an SPE to Issue Debt Securities.  A threshold question for this 
structure—as it was for the back-to-back borrowing structure—is whether the Executive 
Branch has the power and authority to create an SPE that could issue debt securities. The 
same analysis and conclusions would apply: that through the issuance of an Executive 
Order, the Executive Branch should have that power and authority, and that the creation 
of such a debt-issuing SPE would not violate Congress’s restrictions on Executive Branch 
creation of corporations under the Government Corporation Control Act.134 
 
 2. Using the Proceeds to Purchase Financial Assets.  In the second step of the 
asset-sale structure, the SPE would use the proceeds of its issued debt to purchase 
income-generating financial assets from an Executive Branch agency or entity. As before, 
the most significant type of Executive Branch financial assets would appear to be rights 
to payment of future tax revenues.135  
 
 That raises the question whether the Executive Branch has the power to sell 
financial assets. Regarding power to sell assets generally, the Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations 
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States . . . .”136 The term 
                                                                                                                                                 
to kickstart the securitisation market, which was discredited by the U.S. subprime crisis 
but is now seen as a valuable option for financing business growth”). 
131 See infra Part III.B.1. 
132 See infra Part III.B.2. 
133 See infra Part IV.A. 
134 See Part III.A.1, supra. 
135 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. [What other types of financial assets 
might the Executive Branch have to sell? cite] 
136 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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“other property” is not limited to real property (i.e., land); it also has been interpreted to 
include personalty—which would include financial assets.137 Nonetheless, as explained 
below, Congress already appears to have delegated sufficient power to the Executive 
Branch to sell financial assets in order avoid default by paying maturing Treasury 
securities.  
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury has statutory authority to administer and enforce 
the Internal Revenue Code.138 Thus, the Secretary of the Treasury has statutory authority 
to collect taxes.139 The Secretary of the Treasury also has the statutory authority and duty 
to pay Treasury securities.140 Implicit in those authorities and duties, the Secretary of the 
Treasury should have the power to monetize (i.e., effectively accelerate the timing of 
collection of) future taxes and avoid default, by selling rights to the payment of future tax 
revenues.141  
 
                                                 
137 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 331 (1936).  
138 26 U.S.C. § 7801. The Internal Revenue Code is Title 26 of the United States Code. 
139 31 U.S.C. § 321(a)(6) (providing that the “Secretary of the Treasury shall collect 
receipts”). 
140 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. See also 31 U.S.C. § 3327 (providing that 
the “Secretary of the Treasury may issue a check or other draft on public money in the 
Treasury to pay an obligation of the United States Government”). Because the power to 
tax is constitutionally given to Congress (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that 
“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes”)), Congress at least 
theoretically would have the power to change the tax delegation to the IRS, thereby 
undermining this structure to the extent it is based on tax revenues as the financial assets. 
The IRS is just a bureau of the Treasury Department so Congress could abolish the 
Treasury Department and establish a new agency; but the new agency would once again 
be under the control of the Executive Branch. The separation of powers doctrine prevents 
Congress from enforcing the law; that power is vested in the Executive Branch. 
141 The Secretary of the Treasury, through the IRS, has even more explicit authority to 
settle and otherwise work with rights to payment of delinquent tax revenues and to collect 
those revenues by any means, including compromises for a reduced tax liability. See 14A 
MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAXATION § 54:141. See also generally 26 U.S.C. § 
7122. The Secretary of the Treasury should therefore have even clearer authority to 
securitize rights to delinquent tax revenues. That, in turn, could also help to shift risk 
from the government to the SPE’s investors on those revenues. 
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 This interpretation is supported by United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,142 in which 
the Supreme Court held that a presidential executive order was sufficient to enable the 
President to dispose of property in connection with the management of public lands.143 
The Court observed that “[e]mergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to 
require that the agent in charge should [act] in the public interest” regarding disposition 
of federal government property.144 Although Congress has not granted “express authority 
. . . , there is nothing in the nature of the power exercised which prevents Congress from 
granting it by implication just as could be done by any other owner of property under 
similar conditions.”145 The Court emphasized that the President’s implied authority “all 
the more readily operated . . . in view of the fact that its exercise was not only useful to 
the public, but did not interfere with any vested right of the citizen.”146  
 
 In our case, if the President issues an Executive Order directing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to avoid default by selling rights to the payment of future tax revenues, he 
would (as before147) be acting pursuant to an implied authorization of Congress148 so his 
                                                 
142 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
143 Id. at 474. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 475. Although the facts of United States v. Midwest Oil Co. indicated a separate 
basis for the implied authority—that the President’s action represented a “long-continued 
practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress,” id. at 474—the Court did not limit its 
opinion to that rationale.  
147 See Part III.A.1, supra. 
148 One reviewer of this article suggested that the Anti-deficiency Act (of which the most 
relevant provision is 31 U.S.C. § 1341) might restrict the authority of the Secretary of the 
Treasury to sell or otherwise transfer (e.g., grant as collateral) rights to the payment of 
future tax revenues. I do not believe it does. In relevant part, that Act prohibits Executive 
Branch officials from committing the federal government to contracts or other obligations 
for the payment of money before Congress has made an appropriation for that money (or 
otherwise authorized the contract or obligation). A contract to sell or grant a security 
interest in rights to the payment of future tax revenues is not a contract that obligates the 
federal government to pay money. To the contrary, it is merely a contract to sell or pledge 
an asset. (Even if it were a contract that obligates the federal government to pay money, 
there is some precedent that the contract would be exempt from the Anti-deficiency Act 
because the contract effectuates the Secretary of the Treasury’s congressional mandate to 
pay government debts. 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 27 (1853)). Furthermore, in the case of 
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authority should be at its maximum.149 Furthermore, under the reasoning of United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co., that sale would be made in emergency conditions (to avoid a 
government debt default), thereby “requir[ing] that the [President and Secretary of the 
Treasury] should [act] in the public interest” regarding disposition of federal government 
property.150 Also consistent with that case, the sale would be “useful to the public”151 by 
avoiding the disastrous economic consequences of a debt default.152   
 
 C. Comparing the Alternative Options 
 For both alternative options, the structures begin the same: creating an SPE to 
issue debt securities in amounts needed to repay maturing federal debt. To that extent, 
they are identical. The differences between the structures are in their second step.   
 
 In the second step of the back-to-back borrowing structure, the SPE on-lends the 
proceeds of its issued debt to an Executive Branch agency or entity on a back-to-back 
maturity basis. In order to avoid the need for congressional authorization, yet make 
investors in the SPE’s debt securities comfortable that there will be a reliable and 
adequate basis of repayment, the on-lending is made on a non-recourse-debt basis 
                                                                                                                                                 
collateral, subsection (a)(2) of the Anti-deficiency Act provides that it “does not apply to 
a corporation getting amounts to make loans . . . without legal liability of the United 
States Government,” and a non-recourse loan by definition is a loan that is made without 
legal liability for repayment.    
149 It is also worth noting that the Ashwander Court, supra note 137, seemed to interpret 
Art. IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2 as a federalism provision, not a separation of powers provision. See 
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 331 (noting that the power of the United States to sell assets was 
“a matter of grave concern because of the fear that ‘the sale and disposal’ might 
become ‘a source of such immense revenue to the national government as to make it 
independent of and formidable to the people.’”). To that extent, one might argue that the 
Constitution does not much care which branch of the federal government is doing the 
selling so long as it’s respecting the structural limitations placed on the federal 
government as a whole, e.g., that the Treasury department shouldn’t securitize assets 
simply to make a profit but may securitize assets in an emergency situation to pay 
maturing debts. 
150 See text accompanying note 144, supra. 
151 See text accompanying note 146, supra. 
152 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Nor would the sale “interfere with any 
vested right of [any] citizen.” See text accompanying note 146, supra. 
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secured by collateral consisting of specific high quality financial assets. The most 
plentiful high quality financial assets that could be pledged as collateral would be rights 
to the future payment of specified tax revenues. The Executive Branch borrower of the 
on-lent proceeds should therefore be the Treasury Department, which has the right to 
receive tax revenues (through its Internal Revenue Service) and also the right to use the 
on-lent proceeds to pay maturing Treasury securities, thereby also satisfying its 
obligation to pay those securities.   
 
 In the second step of the asset-sale structure, the SPE uses the proceeds of its 
issued debt to purchase income-generating financial assets from an Executive Branch 
agency or entity. As in the back-to-back borrowing structure, the most plentiful high 
quality financial assets that could be purchased would be rights to the future payment of 
specified tax revenues. Congress has already delegated sufficient power to the Executive 
Branch to sell financial assets in order to pay maturing Treasury securities. The Executive 
Branch seller of the tax revenues should therefore be the Treasury Department (which has 
the right to receive those revenues). The Treasury Department also has the right to use the 
proceeds of the sale to pay maturing Treasury securities, thereby (again) also satisfying 
its obligation to pay those securities. 
 
 As explained in this article, both of these structures should be legally valid and 
constitutional. However, the asset-sale structure may be cleaner for several reasons. It is 
closer to traditional securitization transactions, which are widely used not only in 
domestic financing but also in financing worldwide.153 That would not only be easier to 
explain in the United States but also should be more accessible and understandable to 
foreign investors, who—as explained below154—may well dominate the purchase of the 
SPE’s securities. Additionally, rating agencies and investors will probably better 
                                                 
153 See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. 
154 See infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text (explaining why foreign investors 
may have greater rights, under international treaties, than domestic investors to enforce 
the SPE’s debt securities). 
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understand the default risk of the asset-sale structure.155 Finally, the asset-sale structure 
has less legal “baggage” because it does not involve any federal government 
borrowing.156    
 
 IV. EXTRALEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
  
 In the discussion below, I first examine how rating agencies and investors would 
likely view these alternative options as a business matter. Thereafter, I discuss how these 
options should be constrained to prevent their potential abuse. 
 
 A. Rating Agency and Investor Perspectives 
 
 Investors in the SPE’s debt securities will have a single goal: to be repaid 
principal and interest on those securities on a timely basis. In assessing the likelihood of 
timely repayment of any debt securities (including Treasury securities and other 
sovereign debt securities), investors customarily rely in part on ratings assigned to those 
securities by rating agencies, such as Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) and Moody’s.157  
 
 Ratings. The highest rating on long-term debt securities is AAA, with ratings 
descending to AA, then to A, and then to BBB and below.158 The higher the rating, the 
lower the credit risk associated with the securities in question as determined by the rating 
agency. The rating agencies follow explicit methodologies in deriving their ratings. For 
example, S&P’s framework for rating structured finance securities considers five key 
                                                 
155 See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text. 
156 Cf. supra notes 121-122 (observing the lack of explicit clarifying precedent for the 
back-to-back borrowing structure). 
157 For background on rating agencies and the rating process, see Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILLINOIS L. 
REV. 1 (2002). 
158 Id. Technically, the use of all capital letters, such as AAA, represents Standard & 
Poor’s credit ratings designations; Moody’s uses equivalent ratings except that only the 
first letter is capitalized, such as Aaa (being the Moody’s equivalent of S&P’s AAA 
rating). 
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factors: the credit quality of the underlying financial assets, legal and regulatory risks, 
payment structure and cash flow mechanics, operational and administrative risks, and 
counterparty risk.159  
 
 Consider how those factors would apply to the SPE’s debt securities. If (as this 
article proposes) the underlying financial assets are rights to the future payment of 
specified tax revenues, their credit quality should be good because taxpayers who fail to 
pay their taxes are subject to interest charges160 and civil and potentially criminal 
government penalties.161 Those rights, however, should be quantified as legally 
enforceable rights before they serve as the underlying financial assets. 
 
 Overcollateralization. Even if those rights are so quantified and legally 
enforceable, some taxpayers may fail to pay their taxes. Individuals, for example, may 
die and their estates may be insufficient to pay the taxes. Companies may liquidate. Even 
though the Internal Revenue Service’s claim for payment of taxes has priority over most 
other claims,162 some taxpayers may ultimately default on paying their taxes. To the 
extent the financial assets underlying payment of the SPE’s debt securities include tax 
claims that ultimately default, the SPE’s debt securities may similarly default.  
 
 To reduce the chance of that (similar) default on an SPE’s debt securities, 
investors in those securities normally expect, and rating agencies rating those securities 
                                                 
159 S&P’s “Principles-Based Rating Methodology for Global Structured Finance 
Securities,” May 29, 2007.   
160 Interest accrues on all taxes not paid when due as well as on all civil and criminal 
penalties imposed. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6611, 6621-22 and 2 WEST’S FED. 
ADMIN. PRAC. § 1639. 
161 Failure to pay taxes is subject to an initial 5% or 15% civil penalty, followed by 
another 5% or 15% penalty for each month that passes, up to a maximum of 25% or 75% 
depending on whether the failure was as a result of negligence or fraud, respectively. See 
generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651-65 and 2 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 1640. Willful tax 
evasion is considered a felony, subjecting tax evaders to up to $100,000 in fines 
($500,000 if the tax evader is a corporation) and five years imprisonment. See generally 
26 U.S.C. §§ 7201-32 and 2 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 1641. 
162 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9). 
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customarily require, the anticipated collections on the underlying financial assets to 
exceed by some margin (e.g., 10%) the amounts needed to pay the SPE’s debt securities 
in full. This is referred to as “overcollateralization,” and it is typically achieved by 
adjusting downward the purchase price (in the case of an asset-sale structure) or collateral 
value (in the case of a back-to-back borrowing structure) of the financial assets for 
anticipated defaults and delayed collections.163 Overcollateralization also can be—and 
often is—effectively achieved by owners of the SPE or other parties contributing some 
capital at the outset to the SPE164; that gives the SPE additional value to pay its debt 
securities if collections on the underlying financial assets turn out to be insufficient.165    
 
 Because the party transferring the financial assets is governmental (i.e., the 
Treasury Department) and governmental entities are not subject to bankruptcy, there 
should also be considerably more flexibility than in a private structured finance 
transaction for the transferor of the financial assets to make warranties as to their quality. 
In private transactions, investors and rating agencies are concerned that strong warranties 
might undermine the validity in bankruptcy of the transfer of the financial assets.166 In 
our transaction, however, the transferor of the financial assets—whether the transfer is 
structured as a secured loan or a sale—will be the Treasury Department. Therefore, the 
warranties on the quality of the transferred assets can be made as strong as the parties are 
willing to negotiate.167 
 
                                                 
163 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, , supra note 60, § 7.02[F]. 
164 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, , supra note 60, § 3.05[A][3]. 
165 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, , supra note 60, § 7.02[F]. Owners who 
contribute capital customarily expect any unused capital to be returned to them after the 
SPE’s debt securities are paid in full. Id. 
166 SCHWARCZ, MARKELL, & BROOME, supra note 104, § 3.03, at 69-86. 
167 Any such warranties on the quality of the transferred assets should be within the range 
of reasonableness, of course. A warranty stating that the Treasury Department would pay 
if a transferred asset did not collect on a timely basis would not be a reasonable warranty 
of quality but a full guarantee, effectively making the loan full recourse. Furthermore, 
warranties exposing the Treasury Department to indefinite damages for breach might 
violate the Anti-deficiency Act. Cf. Lublin Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 53 (2011) 
(the Anti-deficiency Act does not prevent contracts requiring the United States to pay 
damages for breach or from indemnifying for fixed or readily ascertainable amounts).    
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 Thus, with sufficient overcollateralization and warranties, and assuming the 
underlying financial assets are legally enforceable rights to the future payment of 
specified tax revenues, the credit quality of those financial assets should be sufficient to 
support a highly rated debt issuance by the SPE.        
 
 Another factor that rating agencies regard as key is legal and regulatory risk.168 
This article has focused extensively on that risk. Because part of that risk turns on the 
nature of the SPE itself, it is useful to make several observations regarding the SPE. 
Before doing that, however, it should be cautioned that most of this article’s legal 
analysis turns on relatively thin precedent and issues of first impression. It therefore 
would be invaluable to investors, and rating agencies, to find a legal safe harbor.  
 
 “Reasonableness” safe harbor. In a commercial context, the concept of “apparent 
authority” creates a partial safe harbor, enabling parties to conclusively rely on the due 
authorization and execution of contracts that appear to be executed by properly 
authorized officers.169 In contrast, however, investors in the debt securities of an SPE 
created pursuant to an Executive Order that appears to be properly authorized cannot 
conclusively rely on the validity of that Executive Order (and thus cannot conclusively 
rely on the validity of the SPE thereby created).170 Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
foreign investors in those debt securities may well be able to conclusively rely on that 
validity. 
 
 If it is reasonable for foreign investors to rely upon the assertions of the Executive 
Branch that the Executive Order validly created the SPE on behalf of the U.S. 
                                                 
168 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
169 See 2A C.J.S. AGENCY § 418. 
170 See, e.g., Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Estoppel and apparent 
authority normally will not substitute for actual authority to bind the United States 
government” (citations omitted)); Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 
420–27 (1990) (explaining that estoppel will apply rarely, if ever, against the federal 
government). 
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government,171 such investors should be able, under the international law requirements 
for attribution of liability to a sovereign state, to enforce the SPE’s debt.172 International 
law explicitly recognizes that apparent authority binds state action.173 This is important 
because the “foreign investor community [already] holds nearly half of all [U.S.] 
Treasury securities”174 Therefore, foreign investor demand should be sufficient to 
purchase enough SPE debt to enable the U.S. government to repay its then-maturing 
Treasury securities.175  
                                                 
171 I would thus argue, although some readers might disagree, that it would be reasonable 
for foreign investors to rely upon an Executive Order that this article analyzes as being 
authorized. In contrast, I would not regard such reliance to be reasonable if it is based 
solely on the Fourteenth Amendment argument, discussed supra Part II.A. 
172 See UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES 
FOR INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS (2001). Under Article 1, an “internationally 
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.” Article 4 
provides that executive action “shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law.” Article 7 provides that the “conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity 
empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act 
of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, 
even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.” Commentary 2 to Article 7 
explains that “The State cannot take refuge behind the notion that, according to the 
provisions of its internal law or to instructions which may have been given to its organs 
or agents, their actions or omissions ought not to have occurred or ought to have taken a 
different form. This is so even where the organ or entity in question has . . . manifestly 
exceeded its competence.” Article 12 states that “a breach of an international obligation 
by a State [occurs] when an act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of 
it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.” Article 31 provides that the 
“responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by 
the internationally wrongful act.” Thus, if the SPE’s debt purported to be authorized by 
the Executive Branch and foreign investors could show, under usual principles of agency 
law, that they reasonably relied on that authorization, that debt would be deemed to be 
enforceable under international law even if U.S. courts eventually concluded that the 
Executive Branch lacked that authority. 
173 Comment 8 to Article 7 of RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, supra note 172, clarifies that “the question is whether [the relevant 
persons or entities] were acting with apparent authority.” Comment 4 to that Article adds 
(citations omitted) that this “modern rule is now firmly established . . . by international 
jurisprudence, State practice and the writings of jurists.” 
174 Terry Belton et al., The Domino Effect of a US Treasury Technical Default, J.P. 
MORGAN 1 (Apr. 19, 2011), http://perma.cc/0ZNnoaut2AB. 
175 Whether foreign investor demand is in fact sufficient to purchase enough SPE debt to 
enable the U.S. government to repay its then-maturing Treasury securities will depend, of 
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 In order to enable foreign investors to enforce their claims, the SPE debt (and in 
the case of the back-to-back borrowing structure, the debt created by the on-lending) 
should ideally include waivers of sovereign immunity from suit. Even absent such 
waivers, however, the United States has, under certain international treaties, waived 
sovereign immunity defenses and agreed to arbitration stemming from debt disputes with 
foreign creditors.176 To the extent the United States has assets outside its jurisdictional 
boundaries, foreign creditors might even be able to legally seize those assets to pay 
certain international arbitration awards.177 Foreign investors therefore should have greater 
                                                                                                                                                 
course, on market conditions at the time. Compare U.S. Treasury Issuance and 
Outstanding, SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA), 
http://sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (indicating that between 
January 2011 and December 2013, the Treasury Department redeemed, on a monthly 
basis, an average of $565.0 billion of Treasury securities and issued $646.9 billion of 
Treasury securities, resulting in a net issuance of $81.9 billion) with Major Foreign 
Holders of U.S. Treasury Securities (monthly), U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Pages/ticsec2.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating that major foreign holders of Treasury securities increased 
their aggregate position by $36.6 billion each month, on average, accounting for nearly 
half of the net issuance). 
176 See Kevin Gallagher, The New Vulture Culture: Sovereign Debt Restructuring and 
Trade and Investment Treaties 2 (The IDEAs, Working Paper No. 2/2011, 2011) 
(explaining that sovereign debt is often an “investment” covered under international 
investment agreements and arguing that this gives foreign holders of sovereign debt the 
right to file arbitration claims in accordance with the procedures laid out in such 
agreements). The U.S. government has effectively provided its consent to be sued under 
forty-one bilateral investment treaties and several regional treaties, including the North 
American Fair Trade Agreement and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement. E-mail from Julie Maupin, Lecturing Fellow, Ctr. for Int’l and 
Comparative Law, Duke Law School, to author (Aug. 22, 2013) (on file with the author) 
(explaining that in these treaties, the United States has consented to arbitrate with foreign 
investors; that these treaties define “investment” quite broadly to include “bonds”; and 
that international arbitral tribunals have held that sovereign debt is indeed covered by an 
investment treaty under this type of broad language). See also Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/09, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 384 (Feb. 8, 2013) (explaining that bonds are considered investments 
under the ICSID definition). 
177 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 53, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]; Convention on the Recognition and 
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incentives than domestic investors to purchase the debt securities contemplated by this 
article.  
 
 The SPE. As discussed, the debt-issuing SPE should be organized as an entity that 
is not a “corporation.”178 Additionally, it should not act “as an agency.”179 Within these 
parameters, there is considerable flexibility. First consider organizational choice.  
 
 Because the organizational choice may be politically influenced, this article does 
not purport to dictate the outcome. It should be observed, however, that if the SPE is 
organized as an LLC, it can be managed like a corporation.180 Furthermore, a commercial 
trust, other than a business trust, is not generally legally recognized as separately 
existing.181 Thus, it is least likely to be viewed as a “corporation” under the GCCA.182  
 
 It is also critical to ensure that the SPE does not act “as an agency.” There appear 
to be two ways to accomplish that: by creating the SPE as a private entity that acts 
pursuant to specific contractual directions,183 or creating the SPE as a government-owned 
                                                                                                                                                 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 4, Jun. 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter “New York Convention”]. If those foreign creditors are 
nationals of states that are party to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention, which has over 140 member states, including the United 
States, Article 53 of the ICSID Convention might allow arbitral awards to be enforced 
against member-state assets. E-mail from Maupin, supra note 142. Additionally, Article 
V of the New York Convention, which has 146 signatory states, including the United 
States, allows the holder of a valid arbitration award to request enforcement of the award 
from the courts of any signatory state. Id. Those courts must enforce the award, including 
by attachment of assets of a contracting state, unless one of a handful of narrow 
exceptions is met. Id. 
178 See Part III.A.1, supra. 
179 Id. 
180 See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 1:11 (3d ed., Nov. 2013). 
181 Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations: Unraveling the 
Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 574 (2003). 
182 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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or controlled entity that does not engage in the implementation of government policy.184 I 
therefore propose that the SPE be created as a private entity that acts pursuant to specific 
contractual directions and does not engage in the implementation of government policy. 
That should be feasible. There is ample precedent for finding and motivating private 
owners of SPEs.185 Furthermore, the functions of the SPE contemplated by this article, 
and thus the tasks of its managers (who should be hired from the private sector), should 
be ministerial: to issue debt securities and, depending on the structure chosen, to either 
on-lend the proceeds on a non-recourse basis, secured by specific financial assets, or use 
the proceeds to purchase financial assets.  
 
 Even though an SPE that acts ministerially does not make government policy, it 
must avoid “implementing” government policy to comply with the GCCA.186 Some 
might argue that a government-controlled SPE used to avoid a federal debt default could 
be seen as implementing government policy. The impact of any such argument could be 
countered, however, by making the SPE both privately owned and privately controlled—
in which case, the GCCA’s policy-implementing restriction would not apply.187  
 
                                                 
184 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.    
185 See, e.g., FITCH INVESTORS SERVICE, INC., STRUCTURED FINANCE NEW ISSUE: 
CORPORATE ASSET FUNDING CO., INC. 2 (June 15, 1992) (observing that “Stone Street 
Contract Partners owns 100% of CAFCO’s common stock”). Corporate Asset Funding 
Co., or CAFCO, is an SPE with capacity to issue $7 billion of debt securities. Id. at 1. 
Stone Street Contract Partners is a partnership formed by members of Goldman Sachs 
and compensated, in the author’s experience, by a percentage of each deal entered into by 
CAFCO. Another way to compensate private owners of SPEs is to allow them to share in 
any surplus overcollateralization. Cf. supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing 
overcollateralization).  
186 Cf. supra note 108 (discussing Lebron v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp., in which the 
Supreme Court said that the GCCA phrase, “acting as an agency” of the United States, 
was intended to restrict the creation of government-controlled policy-implementing 
corporations). 
187 The precedent for that SPE’s validity would be two-fold: under Lebron v. Nat’l 
Railroad Passenger Corp., that although policy-implementing, the SPE is not 
government-controlled; and under Varicon Int’l v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., that the SPE is 
a private entity that acts pursuant to specific contractual directions.  
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 However the debt-issuing SPE is organized, it should be created and staffed—and 
its operating structure, including the back-to-back borrowing or asset-sale structure, 
should be finalized—well in advance of a debt-ceiling dispute. That is critical to enable 
the SPE to be prepared to issue debt securities as and when needed to avert default.188 
The most time-consuming process, for example, might involve obtaining rating-agency 
ratings of the SPE’s debt securities.189     
 
 Other factors that rating agencies regard as key are payment structure and cash 
flow mechanics, and operational and administrative risks.190 Those factors should not be 
at issue in the context of the debt-issuing SPE contemplated by this article. The final 
factor that rating agencies regard as key is counterparty risk.191 I see no need for 
counterparties, however, in the context of this article’s contemplated SPE.192   
 
  Implicit de facto government guarantee. Another factor that rating agencies and 
investors might view as relevant in the context of this article’s contemplated SPE is the 
possibility of an implicit de facto government guarantee of the SPE’s debt.193 In public 
finance, a state will often have strong economic motivations to backstop the debt of its 
                                                 
188 This article does not purport to address strategic political considerations, such as 
whether the President might want the threat of a default to be real—and thus might prefer 
not to implement any means to avert default—in order to exert maximum pressure on 
Congress. 
189 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text. 
190 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
191 Id. 
192 In many commercial transactions, the SPE debt is dependent on payments from one or 
more counterparties, such as providers of currency swaps. Rating agencies then evaluate 
the counterparties’ financial stability, because they could constitute a “weak link”: if, for 
example, they fail to perform their swap obligations, the SPE may have insufficient funds 
in the relevant currency to pay its debt securities. SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS, 
, supra note 60, § 7.03[F]. 
193 See SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 381-83 (observing that, in the state 
context, rating agencies give top investment-grade ratings to SPE-issued public debt, 
partly based on the SPE’s expected cash flows and partly based on the reality that the 
state will not allow its SPE-debt to default because that would jeopardize the state’s own 
credit rating). Also see Steven L. Schwarcz, “Special-Purpose Entities in National 
Finance” (work-in-progress on file with author). 
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SPEs. A default on such debt could signal uncertainty as to whether the state will pay its 
debts generally, thereby jeopardizing the state’s credit rating.194 For example, in 1984 the 
State of Ohio stood behind its water development authority’s revenue debt in order to 
reduce rating-agency scrutiny of a technical default on that debt.195 Markets and investors 
likewise believe that the economic compulsion to avoid increased borrowing costs 
resulting from a default on state-SPE debt provides incentive for the state to pay that debt 
to avoid an SPE default.196  
 
 Additionally, a state may support payment of an SPE’s debt merely to protect the 
state’s reputation more generally. In a corporate context, for example, at the outset of the 
2008 financial crisis many banks backstopped their affiliated structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs) solely to protect their own reputations.197 In the case of Citigroup, this 
occurred notwithstanding that it reduced the capital ratio that regulators monitor to gauge 
                                                 
194 Cf. Standard & Poor’s, Moral Obligation Bonds 3 (June 27, 2006) (observing that if “a 
properly structured moral obligation defaulted, despite clear original legislative support, 
the state’s willingness to pay on its other debt would need to be examined”); NY State 
Office of the State Comptroller, Frequently Asked Questions About State Debt, 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/debtfaq.htm (last visited July 16, 2011) (“Although the 
State is not obligated to pay [non-State-funded] debt, a default may affect other State debt 
by making it more costly for public authorities to borrow. As such, it might be financially 
advantageous for the State to make payments in the case of a default by a public 
authority.”). 
195 E-mail from W. Bartley Hildreth, Professor of Public Management and Policy, 
Georgia State University Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, to the author (Apr. 25, 
2011). 
196 See, e.g., e-mail from Scott Fein, partner, Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP and 
Chair, Public Authority Project of the Government Law Center, Albany Law School, to 
the author (Aug. 31, 2011): “Your observation about credit issues associated with default 
is in this State [New York] absolutely correct. Moral obligation bonds[] are, as you know, 
referred to on Wall Street as ‘feel good bonds’ . . . they allow the State to feel good that 
it’s not really increasing the State’s aggregate debt and Wall Street to feel good that 
moral obligation debt is really GO debt in different clothing. Both know that although it 
may only be a moral commitment . . . a default would . . . run the risk of curtailing the 
capital markets to the State.” 
197 Shannon D. Harrington and Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs on 
Balance Sheet (Update3), BLOOMBERG NEWS (Dec. 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aT0Ix2iDnZRk (reporting 
that Citigroup Inc. did this in the amount of $49 billion, following similar decisions by 
HSBC Holdings Plc and WestLB AG to backstop their SIVs). 
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that bank’s ability to withstand losses on bad loans198 and caused Moody’s to lower the 
bank’s long-term credit rating.199 The reputational harm of not supporting payment of an 
SPE’s debt may be even greater in a state than a corporate context because “investor 
perception of an implicit . . . government guarantee is hard to break,”200 even by 
“statutory disclaimers and [prospectus] disclosures” that the SPE debt is not backed by 
the government.201   
 
 Thus, for these reasons—to avoid jeopardizing its credit rating and to generally 
protect its reputation—a state may well backstop the debt of its SPEs notwithstanding the 
absence of a legal obligation to do so.202 These reasons would appear to be less 
compelling, however, in the context of a privately owned and controlled debt-issuing 
SPE, even if the SPE was originally created by the Treasury Department. A default by 
that SPE on its debt securities would be highly unlikely to jeopardize credit ratings on 
full-faith-and-credit backed Treasury securities. Nor should such a default impair the U.S. 
government’s reputation if investors receive proper disclosure about the risks inherent in 
the SPE’s debt securities. That disclosure should prominently warn of the risk that 
collections on the underlying financial assets might be insufficient, notwithstanding any 
applicable overcollateralization, to pay those debt securities in full and on a timely basis. 
 
                                                 
198 Id. 
199 Id. (reporting a lowering from Aa2 to Aa3). 
200 Cheryl D. Block, Congress and the Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle 
Black?, 82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 437 (2003) (referencing investor perception of an implicit 
U.S. government backing of Fannie Mae’s debt). 
201 Id. (referencing statutory disclaimers and prospectus disclosures that Fannie Mae’s 
debt is not backed by the U.S. government). In 1963, for example, the City of Chicago 
paid eighty percent of the back interest on bonds issued by the Calumet Skyway 
Authority due to a “feeling that a bond default by the Authority might damage the city’s 
overall bond rating.” JERRY MITCHELL, THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT WITH GOVERNMENT 
CORPORATIONS 97 (1999) (citations omitted).  
202 A state may also decide to support payment of SPE debt, even though the state is not 
legally obligated to do so, if the SPE operates as an integral part of government—
essentially a “too important to fail” variant of the corporate notion of too-big-to-fail. In a 
federal context, for example, this is exemplified by the U.S. government’s support of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s debt in order to promote stability and liquidity in the 
housing markets. SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 382. 
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 Rating agencies and investors should understand that risk, especially if the SPE 
utilizes the asset-sale structure. Recall that that structure is similar to the structure of a 
traditional securitization transaction, and investors in those types of transactions have 
experience taking the risk of the underlying financial assets.203 It might be less certain, 
however, that rating agencies and investors will understand the default risk if the SPE 
utilizes the back-to-back borrowing structure. That’s because investors do not always 
fully understand the significance of non-recourse debt. Indeed, arguably partly as a result 
of that lack of understanding, Congress included a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that 
sometimes gives creditors full recourse against non-recourse borrowers.204 Because the 
obligor on the non-recourse debt is the Treasury Department, some investors might 
mistakenly think that the credit of the Treasury Department stands behind the SPE’s debt 
securities. If the SPE ever defaults on its debt securities and investors claim they were 
misled—and especially if the media, including the foreign media given the likely 
dominance of foreign investors,205 makes a big enough outcry—it is not inconceivable 
that the Treasury Department might decide to backstop the SPE’s debt securities.206 
 
 B. Curbing Potential Abuses 
 
 The alternative options for avoiding default should be distinguished from the 
current widespread abuse of SPE borrowing by states. As mentioned, one of the reasons 
states engage in SPE borrowing is to avoid violating archaic state-constitution-mandated 
debt ceilings.207 That use, which would be similar to the federal government’s use of SPE 
borrowing to avoid default, is arguably legitimate because, “[w]ithout the ability to get 
                                                 
203 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 211, 217 (2009). 
204 See 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A). That provision would not apply, of course, against the 
Treasury Department, which is not subject to the Bankruptcy Code. 
205 See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text. 
206 Indeed, the reality is that sponsors have often stood behind their defaulting SPEs, 
creating the perception of a de facto guarantee. See supra note 197-199 and 
accompanying text. The fact that the U.S. government’s supported Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s debt, even though that was done because these entities operated as an 
integral part of government (see supra note 202), adds to that perception.    
207 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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around these [debt limits], many states ‘would barely be able to function.’”208 Admittedly 
in each case there may be a “more democratic way of addressing the [debt] limits”209—in 
the case of states, to amend their “constitutions to increase or remove” the debt limits210; 
and in the case of the federal government, for Congress to vote to increase the federal 
debt limit. But faced with the reality and consequences of default, SPE borrowing is a 
practical necessity. 
 
 Nonetheless, SPE borrowing has increasingly become subject to abuse in state 
public finance. The most prevalent reason that states currently engage in SPE borrowing 
is to reduce financial transparency and avoid public scrutiny. Even though states de facto 
guarantee their SPE debt,211 such debt “is rarely shown as debt on state balance sheets 
and, even when shown . . . , may not be easily discernible.”212 This “lack of transparency 
can undermine public finance and also make it even more likely that states will continue 
to manage their financial affairs with insufficient regard to their ability to repay their 
debts.”213 Sadly, the monitoring insufficiency of states, absent appropriate media 
attention (which has been lacking214), makes states even more likely than corporations to 
use SPEs to hide their debt.215 
 
 Any federal use of SPE borrowing to avoid default should pay great care to 
counteract this potential illegitimacy, including through clear and transparent 
disclosure—not only to investors, but also to the public generally—of that debt and the 
                                                 
208 SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 378 (quoting from a telephone interview 
with a leading public finance lawyer). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 See supra note 197-199 and accompanying text. 
212 SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 380. That article gives the example of New 
York State showing $48.5 billion of debt in its 2006 financial statements but failing to 
show another $80 billion of New York State SPE debt. Id. 
213 Id. at 383. 
214 In April 2012, the New York Times accepted for publication an op-ed I wrote on this 
topic. To date they have failed to publish it, although they maintain their intention to do 
so.  
215 SPEs in Public Finance, supra note 50, at 388. 
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federal government’s de facto obligations, if any, as well as any legal obligations with 
respect to that debt.216  
 
 V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Even a “technical” default by the United States on its debt, such as a delay in 
paying principal or interest due to Congress’s failure to raise the federal debt ceiling, 
could have serious systemic consequences, destroying financial markets and undermining 
job creation, consumer spending, and economic growth. The ongoing political 
gamesmanship between Congress and the Executive Branch has been threatening—and 
even if temporarily resolved, almost certainly will continue to threaten—such a default. 
The various options discussed in the media for averting a default have not been legally 
and pragmatically viable. 
 
 This article proposes new options for avoiding default, arguing that although the 
Executive Branch lacks authority to directly issue Treasury securities above the debt 
ceiling, it should have the power to raise financing by monetizing future tax revenues. In 
each of the proposed options, a non-governmental special-purpose entity (SPE) would 
issue securities in amounts needed to repay maturing federal debt. Depending on the 
option, the SPE would either on-lend the proceeds of its issued securities to the Treasury 
Department on a non-recourse basis, secured by specified future tax revenues; or the SPE 
would use the proceeds of its issued securities to purchase rights to future tax revenues 
from the Treasury Department. In each case, therefore, a finite set of future tax 
revenues217 would form the basis of repayment to investors.  
 
 These options should be legally valid and constitutional, notwithstanding the debt 
ceiling: neither involves the issuance of general-obligation or full-faith-and-credit 
                                                 
216 The only legal obligations should be on warranties as to the quality of transferred 
financial assets. See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text. 
217 In finance, a finite set of future revenues is typically referred to as a finite “pool” of 
those revenues. 
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government debt, and indeed the second option doesn’t involve the issuance of any 
government debt. Furthermore, based on the similarities of these options to successful 
financing transactions that are widely used in the United States and abroad, the securities 
issued thereunder should receive high credit ratings and also be attractive to investors. 
Because of provisions in foreign treaties, those securities should be especially attractive 
to foreign investors—who already purchase half of all Treasury securities.  
 
 These options are not intended to be standard financing structures. Being riskier 
than full-faith-and-credit Treasury securities, the securities issued under these options 
would almost certainly have to pay a higher interest rate than Treasury securities.218 The 
options should therefore be viewed, and this article presents them, as viable emergency 
measures, if needed, to avoid a U.S. debt default. 
                                                 
218 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  
